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Brexit	was	not	the	voice	of	the	working	class	nor	of
the	uneducated	–	it	was	of	the	squeezed	middle
Lorenza	Antonucci,	Laszlo	Horvath,	and	André	Krouwel	challenge	the
popular	view	of	Leave	voters	as	those	left	behind	educationally	and
financially.	They	explain	why	it	is	individuals	from	an	intermediate	class,
whose	financial	position	has	been	declining,	that	represent	an	important
section	of	the	Brexit	vote.
Over	the	past	year	or	so,	Brexit	has	been	interpreted	as	the	symbol	of	a	historical	shift	to	anti-establishment
politics,	kicking	off	a	surge	in	the	‘outsider’	vote	across	Europe	and	the	United	States.	In	line	with	this	narrative,
initial	interpretations	of	the	vote	depicted	Leave	voters	as	marginalised	segments	of	the	population	–	both
educationally	and	economically	–	who	had	channelled	their	discontent	through	the	referendum.
Another	popular	view	that	emerged	is	that	Brexit	was	the	unified	response	of	the	working	class	which	finally	found
its	long-lost	voice.	Yet	subsequent,	rigorous	analysis	showed	that	the	profile	of	Brexit	voters	is	more
heterogeneous	than	initially	thought,	and	that	it	includes	voters	with	high	education	and	‘middle	class’	jobs.	If
Brexit	is	really	connected	to	socio-economic	factors,	how	do	we	make	sense	of	this	apparent	contradiction?
For	our	own	study,	we	implemented	a	unique	set	of	questions	in	a	post-referendum	survey,	focusing	on	the
‘ordinary	Brits’	–	the	intermediate	class.	This	intermediate	class	refers	to	‘ordinary’	families	with	intermediate	or
upper-intermediate	levels	of	education,	stable	jobs,	and	median	levels	of	income,	but	which	nonetheless	face	an
increasing	challenge	in	maintaining	their	life-style.	This	term	is	preferred	to	the	popularised	understanding	of
class	in	the	UK,	which	opposes	the	‘working	class’	to	the	‘middle	class’.	Echoing	what	Joan	Williams	has	stressed
in	her	analysis	of	Trumpism,	public	debates	discussing	the	popularity	of	populism	amongst	the	working	class	in
most	cases	refer	to	the	impoverished	middle	class,	rather	than	the	poor	and	the	left	behind.	Our	argument	is	that,
rather	than	representing	the	‘left	out’,	Brexit	was	the	voice	of	this	intermediate	class	who	are	in	a	declining
financial	position.	This	category	of	voters	represent	a	group	of	high	sociological	relevance	also	labeled	as	‘the
squeezed	middle’.
Brexiters:	the	least	educated	voters?
The	left-out	argument	has	been	constructed	around	voters	whose	low	levels	of	education	render	them	unable	to
compete	with	those	with	a	university	degree	in	the	globalised	economy.	Academic	research	has	already	argued
against	this.	For	example,	Goodwin	and	Heath	show	that	voters	with	A-level	education	from	low	skilled
communities	had	similar	pro-Leave	voting	profiles	to	those	with	no	education.	With	this	in	mind,	the	first	set	of	our
models	looks	at	the	probability	of	voting	Leave	within	a	number	of	educational	categories,	and	also	explores	the
combined	effect	of	education	with	financial	circumstances.
In	all	specifications	of	our	regression	models,	we	also	include	gender,	age,	and	2015	GE	vote	as	individual	level
predictors,	as	well	as	cluster	respondents	within	11	UK	regions	to	account	for	the	geographical	variability	in	the
Leave	vote.	Samples	sizes	vary	for	these	models	between	N=1,473	and	1,382.
Figure	1.	Predicted	probabilities	by	education	(left	panel)	and	by	perceived	change	in	financial	situation	(right
panel).
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Our	findings	confirm	a	negative	relationship	between	education	and	voting	Leave:	the	higher	the	level	of	one’s
education,	the	lower	the	likelihood	of	them	voting	Leave.	Our	findings,	however,	reject	the	dichotomous	view	of
the	low-educated	Brexiter	vs	the	high-educated	Remainer,	by	showing	that	two	groups	with	intermediate	levels	of
education	(voters	with	good	GSCEs	and	A-levels)	were	more	pro-Leave	than	the	low-educated	(those	with	no
formal	education	and	with	low	GSCE	grades).
Looking	into	how	personal	finances	have	changed	within	these	education	categories,	we	find	an	interesting
dynamic	(Figure	1).	While	worsening	financial	conditions	increased	the	probability	of	voting	Leave,	the	effect	of
stagnation	is	ambiguous.	In	our	model,	respondents	with	A-levels	slide	towards	a	Leave	vote	as	their	economic
conditions	worsen.	Our	model	also	predicts	that	those	with	lower	grade	GSCEs	would	vote	Leave	only	if	their
economic	conditions	had	not	changed.
Challenging	the	myth	of	Brexit	as	a	working	class	vote
A	second	set	of	models	presents	the	impact	of	self-assessed	social	class	membership	and	income	on	voting
Leave.	In	other	respects,	these	models	are	identical	to	the	previous	by	controlling	for	individual-level
demographics	as	well	as	geographical	clustering.	Our	sample	sizes,	however,	drop	significantly	as	we	had	to
recover	these	variables	from	previous	waves	of	data	collection,	down	to	279,	meaning	these	results	must	be	read
with	caution.
Looking	at	class	first,	we	find	the	Leave	vote	to	be	associated	with	middle	class	identification	and	the	more
neutral	‘no	class’	identification.	But	we	find	no	evidence	of	a	link	with	working	class	identification.
Self-assessment	of	class	presents	obvious	limitations,	but	our	findings	become	even	more	relevant	if	we	consider
that	Britons	tend	to	identify	themselves	as	working	class	–	even	when	holding	middle	class	jobs.	This	analysis
does	not	rule	out	the	popularity	of	the	Leave	vote	within	particular	working	class	communities,	but	it	aims	to	show
that	the	Leave	vote	is	far	from	being	the	expression	of	a	singular	and	conscious	working	class,	as	commentators
assume.	It	instead	confirms	that	the	middle	class	support	was	very	relevant	to	the	Brexit	outcome	–	perhaps	the
predominant	group	behind	Brexit,	as	argued	by	Dorling.
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We	then	turn	to	analyse	whether	Brexit	has	been	supported	by	an	intermediate	group	in	objective	terms.	In	order
to	do	this,	our	models	tease	out	the	proportion	of	Leave	voters	within	income	categories.	The	result	is	partly
similar	to	previous	reports	in	that	higher	income	would	link	to	the	Remain	vote.	Still,	it	is	only	the	top	quantile	–
the	richest	respondents	–	who	slant	significantly	towards	Remain.	But	we	do	not	find	enough	evidence	to	show
that	the	effect	of	income	is	incremental:	that	the	intermediate	class	would	be	more	likely	to	vote	Remain	than	the
poorest	groups	(Figure	2).
Figure	2.	Predicted	probabilities	by	income	quantiles	and	class	identification.
So,	based	on	the	above,	the	Leave	vote	was	not	more	popular	among	the	low	skilled,	but	rather	among
individuals	with	intermediate	levels	of	education	(A-Levels	and	GSCE	high	grades),	especially	when	their	socio-
economic	position	was	perceived	to	be	declining	and/or	to	be	stagnant.	These	findings	point	to	an	alternative
narrative	to	that	of	the	left	behind.
This	argument	of	the	squeezed	middle	being	behind	Brexit	raises	new	questions	about	how	the	new	politics	of
inequality	influences	voting,	for	it	shows	that	Brexit	was	the	expression	of	a	widely	felt	social	malaise	that	affects
ample	segments	of	the	population.
_________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	a	co-authored	article,	published	in	Competition	&	Change	(DOI:
10.1177/1024529417704135).
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